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In some recent papers, Max Coltheart has questioned the ability of neuroimaging
techniques to tell us anything interesting about the mind and has thrown down the
gauntlet before neuroimagers, challenging them to prove he is mistaken. Here I analyze
Coltheart’s challenge, show that as posed its terms are unfair, and reconstruct it so
that it is addressable. I argue that, so modified, Coltheart’s challenge is able to be met
and indeed has been met. In an effort to delineate the extent of neuroimaging’s ability
to address Coltheart’s concerns, I explore how different brain structure-function re-
lationships would constrain the ability of neuroimaging to provide insight about psy-
chological questions.
1. Introduction. While most people err in thinking that functional mag-
netic resonance imaging is a key for unlocking every scientific door guard-
ing the secret mysteries of human brain function, others err in claiming
not only that neuroimaging can’t tell us everything we wish to know about
the mind, but (much more implausibly) that neuroimaging is unsuited to
telling us anything about the mind. Max Coltheart is one of these skeptics.
His interest is in “learning about cognition itself” (Coltheart 2006). By
this, I believe that he means learning about cognition independently of
implementation details, such as where cognitive processes are instantiated
in the brain. Coltheart claims that neuroimaging has not yet told us
anything about cognition itself and doubts that it can. He is mistaken to
think this. In understanding where he goes wrong, we gain a deeper un-
derstanding of the nature of mind-brain relations.
†To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College,
Hanover, NH 03755; e-mail: adina.roskies@dartmouth.edu.
‡This work was supported in part by an Australian Research Council fellowship at
the University of Sydney. I would like to thank Max Coltheart for his correspondence
and comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
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2. Coltheart’s Challenge. Several critiques of neuroimaging are extremely
deflationary (Poeppel 1996; Van Orden and Paap 1997; Uttal 2001), and
others have expressed their skepticism (e.g., Fodor 1999), but Max Colt-
heart has provided the most focused and thought-provoking challenge to
neuroimagers. While he refrains from making any in-principle claim about
brain imaging, acknowledging that future studies could prove him wrong,
he does make the following rather strong claim: “I’ll claim that no func-
tional neuroimaging research to date has yielded data that can be used
to distinguish between competing psychological theories” (Coltheart
2006b, 323). Coltheart’s provocative challenge to those who disagree is
to provide examples of studies that disprove his claim. In a special issue
of Cortex, a number of neuroimagers take on this challenge, addressing
the question of what, if anything, we have learned from neuroimaging
(Coltheart 2006). In Coltheart’s rejoinder he attempts to refute the can-
didates on a case-by-case basis (Coltheart 2006).
Coltheart’s question is whether neuroimaging has ever given us reason
to distinguish between two candidate psychological theories. Coltheart
makes an effort to be quite clear about the terms of his challenge. First,
he says, this is not an in-principle claim, but merely (at this stage) an in-
practice one, concerning what we have learned from neuroimaging so far.
Second, rather than providing an exhaustive review of the literature or
arguing on a purely theoretical basis, his strategy is to refute purported
counterexamples on a case-by-case basis. Finally, he tells us exactly what
we would need to show to successfully respond to the challenge. We need
to have two competing psychological theories, where these are theories
“expressed solely at the psychological level.” As he puts it,
I must always begin by stating two or more psychological theories
. . . concerning that domain. Then I can consider whetherT Ta b
there has been any neuroimaging work that has yielded data which
provides good reason to favour one of these theories over the others.
So what’s needed is to show that predicts X whilst predicts ∼X,T Ta b
where X is some pattern of neuroimaging data, and then to show
that there exists functional neuroimaging work which demonstrates
that X is the case or demonstrates that ∼X is the case. (Coltheart
2006b, 324–325)
Coltheart also tells us what he means by “distinguish[ing] between the-
ories.” Recognizing that definitive evidence in science is hard to come by,
he doesn’t require that any result provide certainty about the truth of one
theory and the falsity of another. Rather, his criteria are quite moderate:
he is looking for data that make one of two theories a sounder bet. In
other words, the challenge is to identify neuroimaging data that provide
evidence in favor of one psychological theory rather than another.
q2
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The challenge appears to be stated with admirable clarity. However, I
contend it is just clear enough to seem straightforward and just obscure
enough to hide the fact that, as stated, the challenge is framed so that it
can’t be met. This becomes clearer when we consider what he means by
a psychological theory.
As Coltheart says, a psychological theory is a theory of cognition “ex-
pressed solely at the psychological level.” By this he means that the theory
can refer only to psychological functions and processes, as well as inputs
to, and outputs from, these functions. Any references to implementation
details, such as where some process goes on or what mechanisms realize
such functions, are not part of the psychological theory, for they depart
from the psychological level. The reason why one might think that location
or mechanism can’t be a part of theories “expressed solely at the psy-
chological level” is that implementation details are presumably irrelevant
to function, at least as conceived according to classical and functionalist
views of mind. Any theory, therefore, that includes references to location
or mechanism would thereby fall outside the class of psychological the-
ories. Thus, the predicates of and must be functional predicates.T Ta b
Let us call the functional predicates , the inputs (e.g., stimuli)F . . . F1 n
, and outputs (i.e., behavior) . Thus, any theory that isI . . . I O . . . O1 n 1 n
expressed solely at the psychological level will be a theory expressed only
in terms of F’s, I’s, and O’s.
Predictions that can be empirically tested must be consequences of
and : they must be derived from these theories. But if this is so, thenT Ta b
the X and ∼X of ’s and ’s predictions must be consequences of state-T Ta b
ments containing only F’s, I’s, and O’s as predicates. That is, the predic-
tions of and must likewise be a function of only F’s, I’s, and O’s,T Ta b
referring only to inputs, outputs, and functions; no purely psychological
theory could lead to predictions about implementation details. However,
for Coltheart’s challenge to be met, the psychological theories in question
must predict an X, where X is “some pattern of neuroimaging data.”
Patterns of neuroimaging data are locations of regions of activation in
the brain, by hypothesis those regions in which the mechanisms realizing
the functions reside. But no pattern of location data is identical to some
function. Therefore, there is no X such that X could be predicted by both
a theory expressed purely at the psychological level and a pattern of brain
activations. The way Coltheart’s challenge is framed simply rules out the
possibility that any neuroimaging experiment will satisfy his criteria.
Corroborating evidence that Coltheart relies on this way of framing
the challenge can be found in his responses to a few of the neuroscientists
that take on his challenge. For example, in his response to Umiltà (2006),
Coltheart accedes that Umiltà has put forth two theories about the nature
of visual attention, described solely at the psychological level:
q3
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. Endogenous and exogenous attention are governed by a singleTa
cognitive system.
. Endogenous and exogenous attention are governed by separateTb
cognitive systems.
Umiltà argues that imaging has shown that endogenous attention activates
two different brain networks and takes this as evidence that supports
and not .T Tb a
Coltheart argues that Umiltà has failed to show that imaging is relevant
to cognition for two reasons. First, he claims that Umiltà “says nothing
about the nature of these two theories at the psychological or cognitive
level: nothing for example about the different functional architectures that
the two theories propose” (Coltheart 2006a, 423). While perhaps this is
strictly true, it is surely not true in spirit: while Umiltà’s theories make
no explicit predictions about the functional architecture of attention, it
is clear that suggests that the cognitive systems will share functionalTa
components, while does not.Tb
Coltheart argues that
one can show that the two theories he [Umiltà] considers are not
psychological because nothing in his paper would be changed if he
had stated the two theories thus:
: endogenous and exogenous attention are governed by a singleTa
brain system.
: endogenous and exogenous attention are governed by separateTb
brain systems. (2006a, 423)
He concludes that “These are theories about the brain, not about the
cognitive level” (423). This argument may look plausible, but it is false.
It is a little like complaining that the statement “Whales eat fish and live
in the ocean” is really a statement about octopi, because it would have
been about octopi if “whales” was replaced by “octopi.” The original
theories as stated by Umiltà are about cognition, and the reworded state-
ments are about the brain. Coltheart wants us to conclude that studies
like this one can be dismissed as irrelevant, because they fail to meet his
criteria for what counts as a psychological theory.
Coltheart uses a similar strategy to reply to several others. He argues
that Jonides’ (Smith and Jonides 1977; Jonides, Dee, and Berman 2006)
results don’t support his theory , because his theory does not predictTa
the results:
The finding that different parts of the brain are associated with visual
and verbal working memory is not support for because doesT Ta a
not predict this result. . . . Suppose the imaging study had found
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that the same brain regions were involved in visual and verbal work-
ing memory: would that be inconsistent with ? No. So all possibleTa
results of this study are compatible with and so no result couldTa
have contradicted this theory. I think the same is true of the example
offered by Vallar. (Coltheart 2006a, 423)
Coltheart continues:
However, there is a pair of theories between which the results of
Smith and Jonides (1997) did adjudicate, namely
: working memory for verbal information is mediated by a dif-Ta
ferent brain system than working memory for spatial information.
: there is a single brain system of storage and rehearsal processesTb
that works on both verbal and spatial information.
The functional neuroimaging results supported and conflictedTa
with . But of course and here are not psychological theories:T T Tb a b
they are theories about the brain, and so not relevant. (423–424)
Thus, Coltheart rules out results as being relevant if brain information is
taken to bear on psychological theory. This is an extreme position for
anyone who takes psychological function to be realized in neural archi-
tecture in any systematic way.
I do not think Coltheart misses the point here. In another article, he
states his radical position more straightforwardly. He calls this the ultra-
cognitive-neuropsychological position:
The other possible aim of cognitive neuroimaging is to use imaging
data for testing or adjudicating between cognitive models. Here the
ultra-cognitive-neuropsychological position is a particularly extreme
one: The assertion is that this aim is impossible to achieve in principle,
because facts about the brain do not constrain the possible natures
of mental information-processing systems. No amount of knowledge
about the hardware of a computer will tell you anything serious
about the nature of the software that the computer runs. In the
same way, no facts about the activity of the brain could be used
to confirm or refute some information-processing model of cog-
nition. This is why the ultra-cognitive-neuropsychologist’s answer
to the question “Should there be any ‘neuro’ in cognitive neuro-
psychology?” is “Certainly not; what would be the point?” (Colt-
heart 2004, 22)
As it happens, I think Coltheart’s claim about computers is mistaken; the
same claim about the brain is surely mistaken. In summary, Coltheart
admits that neuroimaging can distinguish between theories about the brain
but denies that they can distinguish theories about the mind. The reason
q4
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that this is so is that no theory about the mind can mention the brain,
so no data about the brain can bear on theories about the mind. It should
now be apparent that the task Coltheart has set for the relevance of
imaging is an impossible one. Because of his stipulation that the theories
of interest must be formulated solely at the psychological level, no psy-
chological theory can possibly predict any pattern of brain activation.
3. Coltheart’s Challenge Revived. Although his challenge is, strictly
speaking, an impossible one, it is unlikely that Coltheart means to pose
a challenge to neuroimaging that is impossible by definition. Surely to
make the above theoretical argument demonstrating the impossibility of
meeting the challenge would have been easier than to refute various sug-
gestions one by one.
Since the in-principle difficulty with the challenge is due to its ruling
out statements that make location information relevant to functional in-
formation, the path for modifying the challenge to render it viable is clear.
Coltheart’s challenge can be revived by allowing bridge principles or aux-
iliary assumptions that enable one to infer function from location. Thus,
if the prediction derived from in purely functional terms (such as “IfTa
then F; if then ∼F”) can be combined with statements suchT T S . . . Sa b 1 n
as “F corresponds to activation in region(s) ,” then conjoined withR Ti. . .n a
S can yield a prediction that could be corroborated or disconfirmed by
patterns of neuroimaging data. Thus, Coltheart’s challenge requires one
either to accept a body of statements that specify functional-S . . . S1 n
anatomical mappings or else to accept a general principle S that there is
a systematic relation between function and location in the brain. The
importance of this principle to the field of cognitive neuroimaging was
emphasized by Henson (2005). Importantly, and somewhat puzzlingly,
Coltheart claims to accept this for the purposes of his argument: “I fully
accept Henson’s assumption that there is some systematic mapping from
psychological function to brain structure” (2006b, 323). He does not,
however, seem to have accepted its implications.
The revised challenge is thus to show that some neuroimaging study
has enabled us to distinguish between competing psychological theories
by providing evidence that weighs in favor of one over the other, where
such theories are expressed at the psychological level. However, we must
also be able to appeal to specific or general claims about functional-
anatomical mappings in evaluating those theories. These claims, of ne-
cessity, cannot be part of the psychological theories because of the re-
quirement that the theories themselves be expressed purely at the
psychological level, but now we recognize that some appeal to bridging
claims is essential. To see how this changes the game, let us return to the
two studies discussed above. Consider again Umiltà’s study. Coltheart
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complained that his competing theories make no predictions about the
functional architecture of attention. However, I think we can reword them
so as to make some, albeit rather vague, predictions. We can charitably
read Umiltà’s theoretical hypotheses thus:
. Endogenous and exogenous attention are functionally similar.′Ta
. Endogenous and exogenous attention are functionally diverse.′Tb
Just how to word these theories is debatable. Perhaps we should say that
they share/do not share functional components and so forth. However,
though such wording does not put very distinct constraints on the pre-
dicted functional architecture, even broad claims like this put some con-
straints on subsequent theorizing.
Now, suppose that Umiltà’s data show that attention is governed by
different brain systems (Coltheart’s construal of his ; Coltheart doesTb
not say whether or not the data convince him of this). If one accepts the
idea that there is a systematic structure-function mapping in the brain,
the following claim S deserves some credence:
S. Activation of the same structures is evidence for operation of the
same functions, and activation of different structures is evidence for
operation of different functions.
Here I use “is evidence for” to suggest that it should raise our credence
in the subsequent claim, but not that it necessitates it or that the proposed
relationship cannot fail to hold in particular instances. Claim S seems to
follow naturally from the claim that Coltheart accepts, namely “that there
is some ‘systematic’ mapping from psychological function to brain struc-
ture” (2006b, 323). Given the data, plus S, one is licensed to infer that
there is more support for over . That is, the studies cited by Umiltà′ ′T Tb a
provide reason to prefer over . And that is precisely the challenge′ ′T Tb a
that Coltheart has claimed has not been met.
Similarly, with respect to the Jonides et al. study, Coltheart has agreed
that the results support the claim that working memory for verbal infor-
mation is mediated by a different brain system than working memory for
spatial information. Call this . The claims and S provide reason to′ ′T Ta a
believe (working memory for verbal information is mediated by aTa
different cognitive system than working memory for spatial information)
over , where and are the psychological theories of interest toT T Tb a b
Coltheart. Coltheart’s challenge still stands, for he contends that no one
actually has advocated the opposing theory, (that a single cognitiveTb
system supports both verbal and spatial working memory). But one can
see, in principle, that neuroimaging data can lend differential support to
one theory over another.
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4. Possible Objections and the Nature of Structure-Function Mappings.
The general form of neuroimaging studies that purport to provide some
insight into the psychological basis of cognition therefore involve some
theory stated at the psychological level, plus auxiliary hypotheses
regarding brain structure–cognitive function relations. WhenS . . . S1 n
leads to predictions that are borne out by data that are contraryT  Sa
to those predicted by , any credence one places in S provides someT  Sb
reason to favor over and thus to distinguish between theories.T Ta b
One way to maintain that neuroimaging cannot be of use to cognitive
psychology is to demonstrate that there is no systematic structure-function
mapping to be had. As I have noted, Coltheart agrees that there is such
a mapping, so that avenue is not open to him. Alternatively, he could
argue that the particular form of S used in various particular inferences
is either false or unwarranted, so that there is no reason to believe that
version of S. Here I consider a few potential arguments for discounting
various versions of S, including the most strong one that Coltheart rejects,
but that others, such as Van Orden and Paap (1997), seem to accept.1
4.1. There Is No Systematic Structure-Function Mapping. This argu-
ment would clinch the ultra-cognitive neuropsychologist’s in-principle ar-
gument against the possibility of brain imaging data informing psychol-
ogy, but it is false. Brains are not all-purpose computing devices like von
Neumann computers: they have highly constrained architectural and func-
tional properties. The fact that focal brain lesions result in disruption of
specific functions, leaving others unimpaired, provides very strong evi-
dence for systematic structure-function mappings in the brain. Decades
of neurophysiological research likewise support the existence of a mapping
between specific brain regions and neural function. It is overwhelmingly
likely that developmental, energetic, and evolutionary constraints have
ensured local structure-function relationships. While no neuroscientist dis-
putes the main claim, many disagreements in the field concern the nature
and extent of the mapping.
4.2. There Is No Systematic Structure-Function Mapping at the Scale
to Which Functional Imaging Is Sensitive. The resolution of neuroimaging
is currently on the order of a cubic millimeter. There are on the order of
100,000 neurons in a cubic millimeter of neural tissue, and it is certainly
conceivable (and probably undeniable) that there are multiple functionally
specialized networks operating within areas of the brain with these di-
mensions. If this is so, we can’t expect neuroimaging to enable us to
1. I do not intend this list of objections to be exhaustive, merely illustrative.
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distinguish these functional components. However, although neuroim-
aging cannot tell us everything about brain function, it would be short-
sighted to claim that it therefore can’t tell us anything. There is ample
evidence that certain brain regions respond reliably to some tasks rather
than others, more strongly for some than for others, and so on. Recently,
using statistical techniques and the anisotropies in brain organization,
some neuroimaging studies have managed to make use of information
from functional units in visual cortex that are below the spatial resolution
of imaging. For example, the orientation of a visual stimulus could be
predicted by the pattern of activation in visual cortex despite the fact that
the spatial organization of orientation columns in cortex is at the sub-
millimeter level (Kamitani and Tong 2005; Yacoub, Harel, and Uğurbil
2008). Admittedly, these have relied on a prior understanding of the basic
functional architecture of this area of cortex and thus are not pertinent
to the question at issue, but they do illustrate that with the right techniques
and auxiliary hypotheses, information about brain function can be
gleaned at relatively fine spatial scales.
In order for Coltheart or someone like him to help himself to this claim,
he would have to argue that there is no functional-structural mapping at
spatial scales above a millimeter. But, although many physiological studies
may focus on functional properties of very small regions of the brain, a
vast body of data, from lesions to electrophysiology, demonstrate that
there is structure-function specificity at much larger scales as well. The
brain demonstrates functional organization at many scales. The burden
of proof lies heavily on the side of the ultra-cognitivist if this is his claim.
4.3. There Is a Systematic Structure-Function Mapping, but Multiple
Functions Are Colocalized. This argument is similar to the above, although
here the focus is on colocalization of function at spatial scales above the
level of resolution of the technique. We know that functions are colo-
calized, especially for functions individuated finely. What this means is
that inferences from region to function are defeasible: Suppose that region
R performs function in task A and function in task B. One cannotF F1 2
be sure whether it is performing or (or a novel function ) in taskF F F1 2 3
C. But perhaps you have independent reason to think that task C involves
. Then seeing signal R in task C should increase your credence inF F1 1
playing a role in task A. A Bayesian analysis can tell you how much it
should increase your credence (see Poldrack 2006).
It is conceivable that relations of colocalized functions could be clarified
if one could differentially involve or or include both in a single task.F F1 2
(Although such analyses involve further assumptions, they are ones ame-
nable to independent empirical substantiation.) One technique that helps
distinguish colocalized functions is called fMRI adaptation (Grill-Spector
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and Malach 2001; Grill-Spector 2006). In fMRI adaptation studies, one
task is used to “fatigue” a group of neurons during a habituation phase
(task A); then one determines whether there is reduced response in the
same area during a different task (task B). If there is reduction during
performance of task B, it is concluded that the same group of neurons is
involved in both tasks, and one infers from the same neurons to the same
computational process or function. If there is no decrement in that region
during performance of task B, it is inferred that a different group of
neurons in the same region is involved in that task, so that two separate
functions are colocalized. The limits of this technique are bound to lim-
itations in designing tasks with separate functional components. If no task
allows one to dissociate functions and , one may infer a single func-F F1 2
tion. The limits of imaging for inferring function are reached in this case.
No one thinks that all functions are colocalized everywhere. In fact,
the more similar functions are to each other, the more independent reason
there is to expect colocalization. If so, then even given the possibility of
colocalized functions, the similarity itself may increase our credence in
some inferences over others. Again, it does seem that the burden of proof
is on the ultra-cognitivist to argue that functions are colocalized in such
a way that the evidence from any given experiment provides no reason
to prefer one hypothesis over another.
4.4. There Is a Systematic Structure-Function Mapping at Larger Scales,
but It Is Redundant, So Different Structures Can Implement the Same
Function. This is also surely true to some extent. It is clear that at some
level redundancy is an important feature of brain organization. For ex-
ample, in primary visual cortex an array of (hypothetically) functionally
equivalent neural modules processes information from different regions
of the visual field. However, though the computations may be redundant,
their spatial receptive fields differ, so there are dimensions along which
they can be distinguished. Interestingly, this massive parallelism (at least
with respect to stimulus sensitivity or receptive field) diminishes as one
progresses up the cortical hierarchy, so that cells later in the visual stream
respond in a much more stimulus-specific manner. It remains, however,
an open question how much redundancy there is in processing at the levels
of interest to cognitive psychology and whether there are methods that
can individuate redundant functions.
The problem of identifying function when responses depend on both
functional role and stimulus (input) specificity is a conceptually difficult
one, but nonetheless one that can be informed by differential and con-
verging patterns of activity. It is true that for any two separate regions
of activity it is possible that both perform the same function. For instance,
Coltheart could claim that Umiltà’s example fails to meet the challenge
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because massive redundancy could make it the case that endogenous and
exogenous attention both involve the very same cognitive operations; they
are merely realized in different brain circuits. However, the relevant ques-
tion is not whether this is possible but whether it is likely. Given archi-
tectural and evolutionary constraints as well as current understanding of
functional specialization in the brain, it is arguably much more likely that
different brain regions are involved in performing different rather than
the same computational or cognitive functions. For instance, it is unlikely
that brain circuits mediating initial performance of a motor task and its
performance after learning would differ if both circuits implemented the
very same computations. The fact that large-scale differences in networks
are evident with imaging is suggestive that different functional compo-
nents are involved in the two tasks (Petersen et al. 1998). It is possible
that the degree to which separate activations should increase credence in
functional differences could be formalized by using data from functional,
lesion, and physiological studies to provide us with prior probabilities of
shared function across different brain areas (Poldrack 2006).
Again, given that one accepts a general principle of structure-function
mapping in the brain, it seems that the burden of proof is on the ultra-
cognitivist to explain why reliable differences in activation should provide
no evidence regarding the likelihood of difference in function.
4.5. There Is a Systematic Structure-Function Mapping, but the Mapping
at the Scales Amenable to Functional Imaging Is Cognitively Uninter-
esting. This is a stronger version of several of the above, for it suggests
that (A) all the functions we are interested in discriminating between are
either (1) colocalized in the sense outlined above, so that they are spatially
indistinguishable and functionally indistinguishable, so that no pattern of
data could help distinguish between models; or (2) multiply instantiated
so that whatever the pattern we see, it gives us no reason to prefer one
model over another; in addition (B) no visible differences in patterns of
activity that we do see that are reliably correlated with various tasks have
bearing on interesting cognitive questions.
I suppose that Coltheart would endorse this option, but this is quite a
strong claim. It relies heavily on a view of what is “cognitively interesting”
for one thing. Cognitively interesting just can’t be “whatever is not ame-
nable to functional imaging,” although the dismissal of studies that show
dissociation of regions during different processes has that kind of ring to
it. Functions are presumably hierarchically structured and can be iden-
tified at various levels of grain (from performance of entire tasks, to
various task components, and probably ultimately to operations of small
local networks of neurons), and there is no single level that is the purview
of cognitive psychology. Neuroimaging doesn’t purport to provide infor-
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mation about all conceivable levels, but it requires arguments to claim
that it is relevant to none of those of interest to cognitive psychology.
Moreover, both A and B are substantive claims that seem to require
argument: they are not a default. One might argue that any version of S
that licenses the inferences that defeat B is more likely than A and B are
to be true, so again the burden of proof is on the ultra-cognitivist. But
once we see the burden of proof in this way, Coltheart’s strategy of dis-
missing candidate studies as failing his challenge by denial of S appears
ill motivated.
5. Conclusion. Coltheart’s challenge makes plain the importance of func-
tional-anatomical mapping to neuroimaging. Some form of functional-
anatomical specification is absolutely essential to imaging (Henson 2005).
However, there has been remarkably little discussion of what sort of spec-
ification is needed and little discussion of what form(s) are likely to be
true and of what implications the possibilities might have for constraining
the ability of imaging techniques to illuminate cognitive questions. My
impression is that many (ultra-cognitivists and others) suppose that a
much stronger form of mapping is needed than is really needed in order
for imaging to play a role in understanding cognition. Only a weak form
is needed for imaging to be relevant, but how informative it can ultimately
be will depend on how strong the mapping is. On the other hand, my
impression is that many cognitive neuroimagers are surprisingly oblivious
to the extent to which the relevance of their methods to their object of
interest depends on the nature of this mapping: The imaging literature is
rife with sloppy inferences and lack of clarity about implicit assumptions.
Although it would be mistaken to suppose that neuroimagers are uncon-
cerned or unaware of these issues, their papers rarely discuss the as-
sumptions that underlie the interpretation of their data and often seem
to take as an unwritten and unproblematic premise a strong functional-
anatomical mapping. More discussion about the commitments underlying
the interpretation of individual studies, and relevant evidence that can
underwrite those commitments, would help make the arguments from
brain activity to functional conclusion much more transparent and would
be a step toward maturity for imaging as a scientific discipline.
Coltheart’s challenge, suitably modified, has been met. However, the
deeper point is that any challenge of the form of Coltheart’s is going to
be hostage to the degree and nature of functional localization. To deny
that neuroimaging data can constrain our psychological reasoning is to
deny that there is any structure-function mapping, and this position is
plainly false. What form the true proposition takes is an important and
difficult empirical question. It is virtually certain also that it is not the
case that for all functions there is a one-to-one structure-function mapping
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at scales amenable to imaging techniques. There are limits to what imaging
can tell us about psychology, and we have yet to determine what they
are. One can acknowledge this while also accepting that neuroimaging
can bear on questions of mind.
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